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3. Technical Aspects of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Uranium Enrichment: How it Works and Why it Matters

Uranium enrichment is a critical process in nuclear energy and weapon development. It begins with uranium mining, where countries like Kazakhstan, Canada, and Australia dominate global production. These nations collectively supply over 85% of the world's uranium.

After mining, uranium ore undergoes processing to produce yellowcake, a material containing about 80% uranium oxide. Natural uranium consists mostly of uranium-238, with only 0.7% uranium-235, the isotope necessary for nuclear reactions. To be used as fuel, the concentration of uranium-235 must be increased through enrichment.

The enrichment process primarily uses gas centrifuges. These machines spin uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds, separating the lighter uranium-235 isotopes from the heavier uranium-238. The level of enrichment depends on the intended use. Power plants require uranium enriched to about 3-5%, while nuclear weapons demand enrichment levels of 90% or more.

Iran’s enrichment activities have progressed rapidly. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was restricted to enriching uranium to 3.67%. By 2019, Iran surpassed this limit, reaching 20% enrichment. Producing uranium enriched to 20% requires 90% of the effort needed to reach weapons-grade levels.

Currently, Iran is enriching uranium to 60% at facilities like Fordow and Natanz. As of 2024, Iran has stockpiled 164.7 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. This level is close to the 90% purity required for nuclear weapons. Experts estimate that Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for up to 15 nuclear bombs within five months.

Iran operates thousands of advanced centrifuges to achieve these enrichment levels. At the Natanz facility alone, approximately 11,000 centrifuges actively enrich uranium to 5%, while others work at higher levels. Fordow, a fortified underground site, focuses on enrichment to 60%.

Iran’s capabilities extend beyond centrifuge operations. The Narigan uranium mine is set to produce 650 tonnes of uranium annually, providing enough raw material for over 50 nuclear weapons. Additionally, Iran continues to develop new centrifuge technologies to enhance enrichment efficiency.

Uranium enrichment generates radioactive waste and poses health and environmental risks. Communities near uranium facilities often report elevated cancer rates and other health issues. Monitoring and containment remain challenging, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raising concerns about Iran’s lack of transparency.

Understanding uranium enrichment is key to assessing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The enrichment process bridges the gap between civilian energy use and military capabilities, placing it at the heart of global debates over nuclear security.

Nuclear Facilities: Natanz, Fordow, Arak, and Bushehr

Iran’s nuclear program operates through a network of critical facilities, each serving distinct purposes in uranium enrichment and nuclear energy production. Key sites include Natanz, Fordow, Arak, and the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

The Natanz Facility, located 300 kilometers south of Tehran, is the primary site for uranium enrichment. Housing nearly 14,000 centrifuges, with approximately 11,000 active, Natanz focuses on enriching uranium to levels up to 60%. This facility has faced external pressures, including cyberattacks,one such attack in April 2021 disrupted operations. As one of Iran’s most prominent nuclear sites, it remains under scrutiny from international agencies and adversaries alike.

The Fordow Facility, built deep underground to resist airstrikes, specializes in producing higher-purity uranium. Current enrichment levels at Fordow reach 60%, with plans to expand production further. Analysts estimate the facility could generate up to 225 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium within two months, sufficient for multiple nuclear weapons. 

The Arak Heavy-Water Reactor, initially designed to produce weapons-grade plutonium, underwent modifications under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to limit its plutonium output. Despite this, the reactor still produces approximately 16 metric tons of heavy water annually. These outputs can be repurposed for military applications if constraints are lifted. 

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, operational since 2011, represents Iran’s civilian nuclear ambitions. Built with Russian assistance, the plant generates over 65 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually. Two additional units under construction are expected to enhance output and reduce the country’s reliance on fossil fuels. 

Dual-Use Technologies and Proliferation Risks

Iran's nuclear program depends on dual-use technologies—items and processes that serve both civilian and military purposes. These technologies play a role in enhancing uranium enrichment, missile production, and advanced research. However, they also present proliferation risks.

One example is the use of centrifuges for uranium enrichment. While these machines can produce low-enriched uranium for nuclear power plants, they can also create highly enriched uranium for weapons. Iran’s IR-6 centrifuges are capable of increasing enrichment efficiency, raising international concerns. With nearly 10,600 advanced centrifuges in operation, the potential for diversion to weaponization is substantial.

Missile technology also benefits from dual-use components. Iran’s ballistic missile program incorporates guidance systems, propulsion technologies, and composite materials that have both military and civilian applications. Many of these components are sourced internationally, often through legal trade loopholes or illicit networks. This raises challenges for export control regimes and international enforcement.

Iran’s procurement of dual-use technologies is facilitated by its partnerships with nations like China and North Korea. Both countries have shared technological expertise and materials that enhance Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities. Additionally, global gray markets allow Iran to bypass restrictions, obtaining high-tech equipment and raw materials crucial for its nuclear ambitions.

The challenges of regulating dual-use technologies are compounded by gaps in international oversight. Less than 40 nations enforce export control laws, leaving vulnerabilities. Organizations like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement aim to mitigate risks, but their efforts are often undermined by insufficient cooperation among member states.

Beyond uranium enrichment and missiles, dual-use technologies extend to research and development in artificial intelligence, materials science, and robotics. These fields contribute to advancing both peaceful applications and military strategies, further complicating oversight and enforcement.

The proliferation risks posed by dual-use technologies demand robust international collaboration. Without stringent controls, the potential for misuse increases, elevating the threat of nuclear proliferation and regional instability.

Baked with love,

Anna Eisenberg ❤️